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Question Title This is a Paragraph. Click on "Edit Text" or double click on the text box to start editing the content and make sure to add any relevant details or information that you want to share with your visitors. Reason & Rationality Learn More Foundation & Advanced Programs at Princeton Session 1: June 7 - June 19, 2026 Session 2: June 21 - July 2, 2026 Why It Matters and why you should care Every website has a story, and your visitors want to hear yours. This space is a great opportunity to give a full background on who you are, what your team does and what your site has to offer. Double click on the text box to start editing your content and make sure to add all the relevant details you want site visitors to know. If you’re a business, talk about how you started and share your professional journey. Explain your core values, your commitment to customers and how you stand out from the crowd. Add a photo, gallery or video for even more engagement. Statistics or Trust Badges 01 CALL OUT #1 02 CALL OUT #2 03 CALL OUT #3 04 CALL OUT #4 Every website has a story, and your visitors want to hear yours. This space is a great opportunity to give a full background on who you are, what your team does and what your site has to offer. Double click on the text box to start editing your content and make sure to add all the relevant details you want site visitors to know. If you’re a business, talk about how you started and share your professional journey. Explain your core values, your commitment to customers and how you stand out from the crowd. Add a photo, gallery or video for even more engagement. Additional Content Section For Further Context James' research on the famous Trolley Problem Immediate Impact James B Estes attended the original Reason & Rationality discussion series in 2023 as a participant and TA, later joining the team to co-found the Reason & Rationality Summer Program. Inspired by the class session on the Trolley Problem, James conducted empirical research into survey respondents’ intuitions about an important Trolley Problem variant. He then authored and published a peer reviewed article entitled Empirical Evidence Reveals the Motivation of Subjects Who Switch Tracks in the Trolley Loop Case. Apply Now!

The Reason & Rationality 2025 Convivium is open to students currently in grades 8 - 12. Please fill out the application form. Student 2 - Application Form and Deposit Student 2's First Name* Student 2's Last Name* Student 2's Email Address* Student 2's Phone Number* Student 2's Year of Graduation* Student 2's Gender* Student 2's Name, City & State of High School Attended* How Did You Hear About Us?* Teacher College Counselor Friend or Family Member Google Social Media Email Other Select One of the Following Options. Note: Preference given to Full Two-Week Program applicants. Are you interested in the full two-week session, or a single week session? Full Two-Week Session One-Week Session I confirm that I am the Student's parent or legal guardian. By checking the box, I give permission for my child to be photographed or recorded during Reason & Rationality’s Summer Program, and that photos, videos, or recordings may be used for program materials or promotion, now and in the future. * I confirm that I am the Student's parent or legal guardian. By checking the box, I confirm that I have read and agree to the Student Handbook . * Deposit will be promptly returned if your application is not accepted. $1,000 Deposit Amount Submit Application and Pay Deposit

The Reason & Rationality 2025 Convivium is open to students currently in grades 8 - 12. Please fill out the application form. Reason & Rationality Complete Application and Pay Deposit Below The Reason & Rationality 2025 Summer Program is open to students currently in grades 8 - 12. Admission is limited because of the 5:1 student-instructor ratio. Please complete and submit the application form below. With summer fast approaching, we will inform you of our admissions determination within 24 hours. Reason & Rationality welcomes intellectually curious high school students from all schools and backgrounds, from the USA and internationally. Some of our enrollees this year come from schools including: Andover (Phillips Academy), MA • Astra Nova School, CA • Branson School, CA • The Brearley School, NY • The Bullis School, MD • The Chapin School, NY • The Collegiate School, VA • Deerfield Academy, MA • Foxborough Regional Charter School, MA • Germantown Academy, PA • The Hun School of Princeton, NJ • International British School of Bucharest, Romania • Jackson Hole High School, WY • Lick-Wilmerding High School, CA • Los Gatos High School, CA • Magnificat High School, OH • The Nueva School, CA • Northridge Prep, IL • Oakwood Friends School, NY • Palo Alto School, CA • Park Tudor School, IN • Princeton Day School, NJ • Round Rock High School, TX • Rye Country Day School, NY • St Christopher’s School, Bahrain • Stanford Online High School, CA • Stanton College Preparatory School, FL • Stevenson School, CA • The Stony Brook School, NY • The Taft School, CT • Viewpoint School, CA • Waterford School, UT. Tuition and Pricing: Tuition is $6,900 for the full program and $4,300 for only one session (room and board included). If you have financial need, please contact us about a $500 per session discount. All applicants must submit a $500 deposit, which will be returned if your application is not accepted. Session 2: Swarthmore College (Check In July 27; Session Runs July 28 - Aug 1; Check Out Aug 2) Parent's Name Parent's Last Name Parent's Email Have You Previously Submitted This Form For Another Student? Student's First name Student's Last name Students Email Gender Year of Graduation High School GPA Street Address Name, City & State of High School Attended How Did You Hear About Us? Teacher College Counselor Friend or Family Member Google Social Media Email Other Students who attend both sessions get the full experience, priority in enrollment and a discount on tuition. However, students unable to attend the full program may apply to individual sessions. * Session 2 (July 27 - August 2, 2025) - $4300 Deposit fixed price $500 Submit Application and Pay Deposit

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Reason & Rationality Foundation & Advanced Programs at Princeton Session 1: June 7 - June 19, 2026 Session 2: June 21 - July 2, 2026 Apply Now What is Reason & Rationality? Reason & Rationality equips high school students with the tools to think rigorously about complex questions, separate fact from ideology, and participate in lively intellectual discussion. The 2-week Foundation Program focuses on 20 Big Ideas in Philosophy, Economics and Ethics. Classes are rigorous, fast-paced and full of humor. Students sharpen their critical thinking and communication skills and leave with a grasp of the intellectual frameworks that empower them to become confident independent thinkers. Peter Bach-y-Rita DEAN OF ACADEMICS Peter Bach-y-Rita: Ph.D., MIT (Philosophy), J.D. Stanford Law School, A.B. Princeton University (highest honors). Dr. Bach-y-Rita's dissertation at MIT was at the intersection of ethics, biology and technology. He has published work on intellectual property, bankruptcy law, and the nature of legal causation. He co-founded Reason & Rationality in 2023. Hear Student Reflections: Hear Instructor Reflections: See What Our Students Have To Say "We learned how we would like to be as people, how we would like to converse with each other and think about the world." - Anne, Princeton 2025 Watch "When I came here, I really noticed that my perspective was broadened because I was first of all surrounded by a bunch of amazing students." - Harry, Princeton 2025 Watch "I can count four distinct moments in the last three days where I had a physical reaction to a philosophical concept that was explained to me" - Harrison, Princeton 2025 Watch See What Parents Are Saying About Reason & Rationality's Princeton 2025 Program Watch James' research on the famous Trolley Problem Immediate Impact James B Estes attended the original Reason & Rationality discussion series in 2023 as a participant and TA, later joining the team to co-found the Reason & Rationality Summer Program. Inspired by the class session on the Trolley Problem, James conducted empirical research into survey respondents’ intuitions about an important Trolley Problem variant. He then authored and published a peer reviewed article entitled Empirical Evidence Reveals the Motivation of Subjects Who Switch Tracks in the Trolley Loop Case. Apply Now!

What We Owe Future Generations By Grace Glukhov In this paper, I will argue we must consider the interests of future generations in any major decision that may significantly impact their lives, as we owe future generations the assurance that we will neither shape their future for the worse nor predetermine them to lives they feel are not worth living. I will demonstrate this through showing we have some moral obligation to future people, in the same way we have moral obligations to those in the present. If one accepts the premise that we should avoid making others feel like their lives are not worth living in the present, it follows that this should extend to our duties to future generations. In the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, Kant says that individuals should not be treated as a means to an end, suggesting that lives have inherent value. I argue that the second formulation extends to the lives of future people. Any lives brought into existence will come to possess the same value as the lives of existing people, meaning we should try to respect future lives in similar ways that we respect present lives. In What We Owe the Future , William MacAskill introduces the idea of longtermism, which says that “positively influencing the long-term future is a key moral priority of our time.” (William MacAskill, "The Case for Longtermism," excerpt from, in What We Owe the Future ) MacAskill claims that future people are a “silent majority” whose lives are shaped by our actions. In support of his argument, he turns to positive trends of the past (e.g. women receiving the right to vote) and examples of what we could prevent (e.g., “engineered viruses [and] A.I.-enabled totalitarianism”). Critics of longtermism might say that this framework places the lives of those who are not yet alive above those who are. They might also say that it is too hard to predict the future. However, I believe we live in an era where we have enough understanding of future threats for us to be able to act in ways we know we can help: for example, climate change. Not only does fighting climate change help those in the present, but it is a topic we understand will detract from future generations’ lives should it be allowed to continue. This is not to say longtermism is the only ideology we should live by. However, it is clear that there is a pattern of social change and improvement when people are motivated by a desire to forge a better world for their children. In the way that previous generations have fought for rights for themselves and for their children—observed through movements like the suffragettes or Civil Rights—by fighting for ourselves and for our descendants, we can create a better world for people in the present and future. In upholding institutions that will continue to harm humanity, we increase the likelihood that future generations will feel that their life is not worth living due to predetermined circumstances. By virtue of challenging institutions that will detract from human life in the present or future, we help not only future generations, but ourselves. Arguments about distance and lack of personal gain should not affect our view of moral action towards future generations. In his 2003 essay We Don’t Owe Them A Thing! A Tough-Minded But Soft-Hearted View of Aid to the Faraway Needy , Jan Narveson argues that while people have a moral responsibility to not harm others, they are not morally obligated to help those they have not harmed. He claims “distance [from future generations] makes a difference only because and therefore if greater distance increases the cost of our doing things at that distance.” He adds “the higher the cost to the agent, other things being equal, the less stringent is that duty. Distance is normally a cost factor.” (Jan Narveson, "We Don't Owe Them a Thing! A Tough-minded but Soft-hearted View of Aid to the Faraway Needy," The Monist 86, no. 3) Under Narveson’s paradigm, we are not morally obligated to help future generations unless we know our actions cause direct harm—something harder to be sure of due to how far away in time they exist from us. In fact, Narveson’s view of distance as a “cost factor” means that helping future generations is burdensome for us. However, I find Narveson’s argument about distance unconvincing for two reasons. Firstly, I believe that non-action is a choice that can still contribute to making things worse for future generations. For example, while someone may not be one of the worlds’ biggest fossil fuel emitters, it is hard to live a normal life without contributing to pollution or harming the environment. If one does not attempt to compensate for some of their emissions, they will most certainly have a role (even if it is a small one) in making the climate crisis worse for future generations. Secondly, though increased distance comes with the potential for more intervening factors and a lessened chain of causation, this does not absolve us of all fault. For example, we (Generation A) may plant the seeds for Generation B to take actions that will impose negative effects on the lives of Generation C. In both this scenario and the scenario of inaction, it is hard to argue that we do not bear any responsibility for suffering. The chain of causation will ultimately lead back to our actions—regardless of our intent. If our actions provide for the potential of future suffering, our distance from that suffering (and any factors in between) does not take away the negative implications of our role. Thus, since we will almost certainly have an impact on future generations, we should feel a moral obligation to mitigate the negative effects our actions would bestow onto future lives. In his paper, Narveson also argues that “very distant people are unlikely ever to be in a strictly reciprocal relation to us,” which means that we do not owe help to future people, as we gain very little (or nothing) from them. (Narveson, "We Don't Owe Them a Thing!") I find this claim to be unconvincing, as we owe things to beings in the present that cannot reciprocate. For example, many would argue we owe newborn babies protection and care. However, our relationships to newborn babies are not reciprocal in the traditional sense. In fact, the love between a parent and a child is often described as unconditional. While we can argue that caring for babies provides us with happiness and fulfillment, there is a strong case to be made that knowing our descendants will be protected and provided the conditions to lead fulfilling lives can also offer fulfillment to us. Thus, just because future generations cannot reciprocate in the traditional sense, that does not lessen our obligations to them. Since each of our actions will have an impact on the future, when faced with multiple choices, we should choose the one that is most moral in that situation. Reasons and Persons by Derek Parfit introduces the non-identity problem, which suggests we cannot be blamed for the suffering of future generations since our actions that caused that suffering have also led to their existence. Parfit argues that an existence with suffering is likely to be better than nonexistence. However, any action leads to a certain future set of people. Though taking the more moral action will lead to a different group of people than picking the less moral action, any action will mean that certain people will exist and certain people will not come into existence. Thus, we should focus on our actions being well intentioned, as to avoid causing suffering to anyone. It is plausible to suggest that trying to center our actions around helping lives that do not yet exist can take away from helping current people. However, as I have argued, we live in a day and age where we have a fairly concrete understanding of both the problems future generations are likely to face and ways in which we can help mitigate these problems. As I discussed, taking action that considers the lives of future generations rarely comes at a personal expense to us. Therefore, we owe it to future generations to make good intentioned decisions about future conditions that will impact them. Bibliography Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals . MacAskill, William. "The Case for Longtermism." In What We Owe the Future . Excerpt from In What We Owe the Future. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/05/opinion/the-case-for-longtermism.html Narveson, Jan. "We Don't Owe Them a Thing! A Tough-minded but Soft-hearted View of Aid to the Faraway Needy." The Monist 86, no. 3. Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons . Clarendon Press, 1987.

Human and Animal Value By Harry Moss This essay intends to answer the following question: if given the choice, should one opt to save the life of one human child or the life of 10^10–ten billion–mice? However, I will interpret this question as follows: should we act as if a human life has value that infinitely exceeds the value of another animal’s life? I believe that this is what the moral dilemma truly seeks to address. For utilitarians–put very simply, those who believe that morality demands we maximize the good consequences of our actions and minimize the bad consequences–the answer to this question tends to be easy. Assuming that there are no extenuating circumstances, we should save the mice. This is because the goal of utilitarians is to maximize total utility. For some, this is the sum total of pleasure in the universe minus the sum total of pain. For many others, utility is something more complex. Using pleasure and pain makes it easy to explain why we should save the mice, though. Ten billion mice almost certainly allow for more pleasure to exist in the universe than a single human child does. Many more complex notions of utility would lead us to the same conclusion. Because the utilitarian answer is easy, and because I am not especially sympathetic to utilitarianism, I will attempt to give a Kantian answer to this question. Kantian ethics focuses on the duties a person has towards themselves and others rather than the quantifiable consequences of actions. Like utilitarianism, it is a monist system–it maintains that there is essentially only one guiding principle. Kant calls this the categorical imperative, but he formulates it in three different ways. For the purposes of this argument, I will use two of these formulae. The first is the Formula of Universal Law. To understand this, one must understand the concept of a maxim, which is a combination of action and purpose. For example: “I will eat this slice of toast in order to satisfy my hunger.” In very simplified terms, for a maxim to be morally permissible, it must be such that one could live in a world where everyone acted according to the maxim. In the case of toast-eating to satisfy hunger, there is no problem. But consider: “I will steal my neighbor’s money in order to increase my wealth.” If everyone acts according to this maxim, no one’s wealth will increase because everyone will suffer constant theft. Such a maxim cannot be universalized, and so is immoral. One can think of the Formula of Universal Law as analogous to “do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” though it is not precisely the same. The second is the Formula of Humanity. This requires us to conceive of other people as ends-in-themselves. The other side of this, which is easy to intuitively understand and is sufficient for my argument, is that we must never treat others as mere means to an end. We cannot use others for our own gain while simultaneously giving no regard to their interests. Because both of these formulae have a certain level of intuitive appeal, I will not explain in any significant detail why Kantians accept them. Going forward, I will make the ironic assumption that the Formula of Humanity applies to non-human animals as well, but the Formula of Universal Law does not (1). I will assume that duty does require us not to treat animals as mere means. However, I will also assume that, when we imagine everyone acting according to our maxims to test their morality, we need not and should not include non-rational animals. Circling back to our dilemma, it is clear that we cannot act in a way which is entirely commensurate with our duty. In order to act in accordance with a conception of humans and animals as ends-in-themselves, we ought to try to save their lives. However, since we cannot save all the lives involved, we are not required by duty to do so. This is in line with a common philosophical idea that if one ought to do something, one must be capable of doing that thing. Using only the Formula of Humanity, the answer may seem clear. Since both the human child and the mice are ends-in-themselves, it may seem we should save the mice. There are more of them, after all, and we understand simple math. All things being equal, this seems a fair conclusion to draw. It is the conclusion I would like to draw, because I myself am committed to the idea that animal lives are of great moral worth. However, all things may not be equal. Consider that Kantian ethics does not define moral conduct by its consequences. This does not in the least mean that we should not choose what we believe to be the better of two outcomes when the option is prevented. However, duty may prevent us from doing so. In that case, we are obligated to choose the “worse” outcome, which is not actually worse in a moral sense because it is the moral choice. In fact, something that is not duty may even prevent us from choosing the better outcome. Consider special obligations. Parents prioritize the interests of their children over the interests of other children, and this is perfectly consistent with the Formula of Universal Law so long as they permit other parents to do the same. However, acting in accordance with this kind of special obligation is not the kind of duty the Formula of Humanity gives us. Parents could decide to weigh the interests of all children equally, and this is also consistent with the Formula of Universal Law. I believe that the Formula of Universal Law often creates this kind of situation, in which several conflicting maxims are morally permissible so long as one adopts them on a consistent basis. A perfect duty like our obligation to never treat others as mere means can break the tie, but we do not always have this sort of duty to fall back on. Now, consider the following maxim: “I shall save human lives rather than animal lives in order to protect the interests of my species.” Adopting this maxim does not permit us to kill animals to save human lives, because that would violate the Formula of Humanity. If, however, one accepts the distinction between killing and letting die, then it may permit us to save the human child rather than ten billion mice. Here is a brief argument for why we should accept this distinction: Let us assume, as I have assumed earlier, that ought implies can. Let us assume also, as a Kantian would be inclined to maintain, that we ought not kill people. Consider, now, a simple fact. All over the world, many people die on a daily basis. Each one of us could devote our time to saving the lives of as many of these people as possible. However, we cannot save all of them. Even removing death by old age, it cannot be the case that each of us ought to never let a person die because it is not possible that each of us never lets a person die. However, I maintain that it is possible and desirable that each of us never ought to kill. Some cases may be exceptions, such as those in which we must kill a prospective murderer to prevent him from completing his act. Such exceptions, however, would not explain why we are permitted to let people die if letting die is, in fact, identical to killing. This is one reason why I believe that we should accept the distinction between killing and letting die. It may otherwise be impossible for us to have a duty which prohibits us from killing. Notice that this argument, if it succeeds, also establishes that we cannot have a duty which simply prevents us from letting people die under any circumstances. I think it is likely that such an argument has been made previously, and so there may be objections to it of which I am not yet aware. If, however, it succeeds, then I believe the maxim: “I shall save human lives rather than animal lives in order to protect the interests of my species” allows us to save the human child rather than ten billion mice. As in the case of special obligation, a contradictory maxim can also be universalized: “Whenever the lives of conscious creatures are at stake, I shall save as many as possible in order to respect these creatures as ends-in-themselves to the greatest possible extent.” Thus, I believe that the Kantian may be permitted to make either choice in the dilemma. This, for me, is an undesirable outcome. Given the brevity of this essay, I very much hope that I have overlooked something which commits the Kantian to saving the mice. (1) It is important to note that Kantians broadly derive morality from practical reason. Practical reason is a faculty possessed only by rational creatures, so it seems difficult to explain why any formula of the moral law should protect non-human animals. Indeed, Kant himself maintained that we have no duties towards animals. Thosewanting for a good answer to this question should seek out Christine Korsgaard’s Fellow Creatures, which makesarguments that initially led me to the conclusion which I assume here.

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We are pleased to introduce the Reason & Rationality 2025 Convivium summer program at Princeton Theological Seminary (June 8-14) and Swarthmore College (July 27 - Aug 2). Reason & Rationality 2025 Summer Program Apply Now For 2026 2025 Faculty Classrooms and Dorms Sample Weekly Schedule Students in grades 8 - 12 are invited to apply. Students who attend both sessions get the full experience, priority in enrollment and tuition discount. We are pleased to introduce the Reason & Rationality 2025 Summer Program at Princeton Theological Seminary (June 8-14) and Swarthmore College (July 27 - Aug 2). Each week-long session will bring together students for deep conversations about the biggest ideas in Philosophy, Policy and Economics in a series of informal and convivial salons with an approximately 5:1 student-instructor ratio . Students will live in the college dorms with their instructors. The animating philosophy of Reason & Rationality is that relationship and conversation are the font of the intellectual life. Session 1 (Princeton Theological Seminary June 8 - 14, 2025) The Value of a Human Life (cost benefit analysis, present value discounting, the significance of future generations) Utilitarianism and The Veil of Ignorance Basic Logic, Intellectual Virtues, Properties of Arguments Moral Realism and Moral Relativism The Trolley Problem Supply and Demand COVID Lockdowns and Ice Cream Cones (total and marginal utility, opportunity cost) Private Property and Prices Complex Systems, Emergent Properties, and the Mystery of Consciousness Norms Unlike our Own (primogeniture, bride price, dowries, indissoluble marriage, cousin marriage) Session 2 (Swarthmore College July 27 - August 2, 2025) 11. Base Rates and the Base Rate Fallacy 12. Selection Bias, Social Desirability Bias 13. Preference Falsification and Self-Deception 14. Harry Frankfurt on Bullshit 15. Bayes’s Rule 16. Do You Live in a Simulation? 17. Rationality, Rationalism and Pascal’s Wager 18. The Conceptual Analysis of “Liberal” and “Conservative” 19. Science Fiction and Philosophy: Life Extension and Universal Basic Income 20. The Ethics of Selling Human Organs and Babies Questions About the Reason & Rationality Vision for Conversation-Based Education? Check out the frequently asked questions on our website or reach out to Reason & Rationality at info@reasonandrationality.com .