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We are pleased to introduce the Reason & Rationality 2026 Convivium summer program at Princeton Theological Seminary (June 7-19) and (June 21 - July 2). Oral Exam Contest 2026 The Reason & Rationality Oral Exam Contest is the first of its kind for high school students. As written essays and essay competitions have been compromised by AI tools and ghostwriting, oral examinations are re-emerging as a reliable way to assess genuine understanding. They are already standard in parts of higher education and are used in some college admissions contexts, as well as undergraduate evaluation in Princeton University’s philosophy department. The Reason & Rationality Oral Exam Contest is open to students attending the full 2-week program at Princeton in Summer 2026. Participation is free for students in the Advanced Program (returning Reason & Rationality alumni) and is $700 for all other students. The rules of the 2026 Contest are as follows. Students who wish to participate should send an email message with their election to: info@reasonandrationality.com by June 1, 2026. Participating students must prepare a short written analysis of no more than 500 words on a topic in ethics to be announced. The contest itself will be held on the second to last day of session. Students will be individually examined by a panel of judges that may include Reason & Rationality instructor Noah McKay (Princeton Ph.D. student) and a Princeton University faculty member. Questions About the Reason & Rationality Vision for Conversation-Based Education? Check out the frequently asked questions on our website or reach out to Reason & Rationality at info@reasonandrationality.com .

We are pleased to introduce the Reason & Rationality 2026 Convivium summer program at Princeton Theological Seminary (June 7-19) and (June 21 - July 2). Reason & Rationality Advanced Program - Princeton 2026 Apply to Advanced Program The Reason & Rationality "Advanced Program" is a 2-week intensive for students who are prepared to utilize the concepts and critical thinking tools learned in the Foundation Program to tackle 20 more complex philosophical, economic and ethical issues with deep critical thinking. The Advanced Program is exclusively for returning Reason & Rationality students. For Summer 2026, Advanced topics include the "meaning of life," the objectivity and subjectivity of value, the existence of free will, and current ethical and political debates. Session 1 - Week 1: June 7 - 13, 2026 Session 1 - Week 2: June 14 - 20, 2026 Session 2 - Week 1: June 21 - 27, 2026 Session 2 - Week 2: June 27 - July 2, 2026 Hear Student Reflections: Hear Instructor Reflections: Program Schedule Tuition and Pricing The program fee of $6,900 covers all classes, activities, housing, and meals for the full two-week program ($4,600 for a single week). A $1,000 deposit is due at the time of application, which promptly will be refunded if the application is not accepted, with the remaining balance being due within seven (7) days of acceptance. Reason & Rationality will refund the full deposit and any tuition payments if request is made prior to April 22, 2026. Program fees will increase in Spring 2026. If your student needs financial aid, please contact us at: info@reasonandrationality.com . Questions About Reason & Rationality's Vision for Conversation-Based Education? Check out the frequently asked questions on our website or reach out to Reason & Rationality at info@reasonandrationality.com .

We are pleased to introduce the Reason & Rationality 2026 Convivium summer program at Princeton Theological Seminary (June 7-19) and (June 21 - July 2). Reason & Rationality Foundation Program - Princeton 2026 Reason & Rationality's Foundation Program immerses high school students in lively, small-group discussions around twenty core topics in philosophy, economics, politics, and decision-making. Taught by Ph.D. students and young professors from Princeton, Harvard and other leading philosophy graduate programs, the two-week program emphasizes serious but playful intellectual conversation — testing ideas in real time, revising views with humility, and continuing discussions beyond the classroom, sometimes late into the evening. Some of our students go on to participate in Reason & Rationality podcasts and related projects, which you can explore on this website. Sample Topics : Foundation Program topics include free will and determinism; probabilistic arguments for the existence of God; the legitimacy of democratic political institutions; and and how economists and philosophers think about cost-benefit analysis, utility maximization, and their limits. Location : Both sessions of the Foundation Program are held at Princeton Theological Seminary in Princeton, NJ. Program Details: Students who, as of Summer 2026, are entering 9th grade through those who have just graduated from high school are eligible to apply. While preference will be given to those applying to the full 2-week session, you will also find an option to apply for a single week. Session 1 - Week 1: June 7 - 13, 2026 Session 1 - Week 2: June 14 - 20, 2026 Session 2 - Week 1: June 21 - 27, 2026 (single week enrollment option for S1W1 now sold out) Session 2 - Week 2: June 27 - July 2, 2026 Note: Full two-week enrollment for Session 2 remains available. Oral Exam Contest: Students who attend the full 2-week program are eligible to participate in an Oral Exam Contest on the second to last day of classes. Led by members of our Princeton-based teaching team, the Oral Exam Contest follows the same oral examination methods used in Princeton undergraduate courses. Participation involves a small additional tuition charge; details will be announced. Hear Student Reflections: Hear Instructor Reflections: Foundation Program 2026 Sample Schedule Week One Week Two Program Schedule Tuition and Pricing The program fee of $6,900 covers all classes, activities, housing, and meals for the full two-week program ($4,600 for a single week). A $1,000 deposit is due at the time of application, which promptly will be refunded if the application is not accepted, with the remaining balance being due within seven (7) days of acceptance. Reason & Rationality will refund the full deposit and any tuition payments if request is made prior to April 22, 2026. Program fees will increase in Spring 2026. If your student needs financial aid, please contact us at: info@reasonandrationality.com. Questions About Reason & Rationality's Vision for Conversation-Based Education? Check out the frequently asked questions on our website or reach out to Reason & Rationality at info@reasonandrationality.com .

We are pleased to introduce the Reason & Rationality 2026 Convivium summer program at Princeton Theological Seminary (June 7-19) and (June 21 - July 2). Reason & Rationality Institute A residential summer program for students entering 7th and 8th grade In partnership with The Pingry School Reason & Rationality Institute introduces middle school students to the world of Philosophy, Policy and Economics (PPE). The theme for Summer 2026 is Rational Individuals, Responsible Systems. Students will learn to reason clearly about complex questions, including: How following individually rational choices can lead to social inefficiencies (the Prisoners Dilemma) How seemingly morally rational actions can produce ethically counterintuitive outcomes (the Trolley Problem) How reasons succeed — or fail — to count as good evidence How individually rational enhancement choices create collective ethical challenges Reason & Rationality classes are lively, humor-filled conversations that encourages students to challenge ideas, follow arguments where they lead, and take genuine pleasure in the shared pursuit of truth. Program Details: The program will be held at Pingry’s bucolic Pottersville Campus, giving students a genuine taste of residential life at a leading preparatory school. Each day includes at least four hours of rigorous, discussion-based learning, followed by exercise and activities including the Pottersville ropes course. Evening programming is both social and substantive. See sample schedule below . Students arrive on July 26 and depart on the morning of August 1, 2026. Rising 7th and 8th grade students (as of Summer 2026) are eligible to apply. See tuition and pricing below . APPLY TO PINGRY PROGRAM Hear Student Reflections: Hear Instructor Reflections: Instructors (Middle School Institute) Ryan is a philosophy PhD student at the University of California, Berkeley. He earned a master’s degree in Philosophy at Oxford (2025) and a master’s degree in Bioethics at NYU (2023). His primary philosophical interests are moral and political philosophy and the philosophy AI. Before studying philosophy, Ryan earned a PhD in Economics from the University of California, Irvine (2013) and worked as a research associate at the University of Southern California (2013 - 2016) and University College London (2016 - 2021). He published eleven papers and delivered fifty research presentations in game theory and behavioral economics. He taught undergraduate and graduate courses in these areas at UCI, USC, and UCL. Ryan Kendall, PhD TEACHING FELLOW Sample Schedule Program Schedule Tuition and Pricing The program fee of $4,000 covers all classes, activities, housing, and meals for the week-long program. A $1,000 deposit is due at the time of application, which promptly will be refunded if the application is not accepted, with the remaining balance being due within seven (7) days of acceptance. Reason & Rationality will refund the full deposit and any tuition payments if request is made prior to April 22, 2026. Questions About Reason & Rationality's Vision for Conversation-Based Education? Check out the frequently asked questions on our website or reach out to Reason & Rationality at info@reasonandrationality.com .

Our instructors hail from world-renowned institutions like Princeton, Oxford, and MIT, bringing unmatched expertise and passion to every session. Reason & Rationality Faculty At the heart of Reason & Rationality are two-hour seminars where scholars from leading programs draw students into the challenges and satisfactions of philosophical inquiry. Peter Bach-y-Rita DEAN OF ACADEMICS Peter Bach-y-Rita: Ph.D., MIT (Philosophy), J.D. Stanford Law School, A.B. Princeton University (highest honors). Dr. Bach-y-Rita's dissertation at MIT was at the intersection of ethics, biology and technology. He has published work on intellectual property, bankruptcy law, and the nature of legal causation. He co-founded Reason & Rationality in 2023. Joe earned a BA in Philosophy with highest distinction from Purdue University and is currently a Philosophy PhD student at Princeton University. He has published 16 articles on topics in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and ethics in leading peer-reviewed philosophy journals. He also authored the books Existential Inertia and Classical Theistic Proofs (with Dr. Daniel Linford) and The Majesty of Reason: A Short Guide to Critical Thinking in Philosophy. On the popular level, he creates lecture videos and hosts discussions with philosophers on his YouTube channel Majesty of Reason. His videos have attracted nearly 1.5 million views in total. Joseph Schmid SENIOR TEACHING FELLOW HEAD OF INSTRUCTION Noah McKay TEACHING FELLOW Noah is a PhD student in philosophy at Princeton University. He earned his BA in philosophy from Covenant College (summa cum laude) and his MSc in philosophy from the University of Edinburgh (First Class Honours). He has published several peer-reviewed academic articles about epistemology, metaethics, and philosophy of religion and presented original research at about a dozen conferences. He has also coached high school debate for seven years. Florence is a Philosophy PhD student at Harvard University. She received a BS in mathematics and physics from the University of Michigan in 2018, and an MA in philosophy from Tufts University in 2020. Her current work concerns the nature of rational agency and free will and what that has to do with the foundations of ethics, in particular influenced by the moral theory of Immanuel Kant. Florence Bacus TEACHING FELLOW Sophia Wyatt TEACHING FELLOW Sophia received her undergraduate degree from the University of Chicago in 2021 and entered the Ph.D. program there in Fall 2025. Her primary interests lie in ethics and epistemology, particularly at their intersection. Sagar is a PhD student in the Joint Program in Philosophy and Religion at Princeton University. He earned his BA in Philosophy and Biology with Highest Honors from Swarthmore College, and prior to beginning his PhD studied at the Rangjung Yeshe Institute Center for Buddhist Studies in Kathmandu, Nepal. His work focuses on the history of philosophy in South Asia, as well as contemporary issues in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and Buddhist philosophy. Sagar Rao TEACHING FELLOW Check out the frequently asked questions on our website or reach out to Reason & Rationality at info@reasonandrationality.com . Questions About the Reason & Rationality's Vision for Conversation-Based Education? Ready to jump into critical thinking and conversation? Apply Now

Reason & Rationality Foundation & Advanced Programs at Princeton Session 1: June 7 - June 20, 2026 Session 2: June 21 - July 2, 2026 Apply What is Reason & Rationality? Reason & Rationality equips high school students with the tools to think rigorously about complex questions, separate fact from ideology, and participate in lively intellectual discussion. The 2-week Foundation Program focuses on 20 Big Ideas in Philosophy, Economics and Ethics. Classes are rigorous, fast-paced and full of humor. Students sharpen their critical thinking and communication skills and leave with a grasp of the intellectual frameworks that empower them to simplify complex problems, connect the dots, and craft compelling arguments. Thank you to all the Reason & Rationality alumni who stay in touch and CONGRATULATIONS to those from the graduating high school class of '26 on your early acceptances to (these are the ones you've told us about) Dartmouth College, Columbia University, University of Chicago, Princeton University, and Trinity College Dublin. Peter Bach-y-Rita DEAN OF ACADEMICS Peter Bach-y-Rita: Ph.D., MIT (Philosophy), J.D. Stanford Law School, A.B. Princeton University (highest honors). Dr. Bach-y-Rita's dissertation at MIT was at the intersection of ethics, biology and technology. He has published work on intellectual property, bankruptcy law, and the nature of legal causation. He co-founded Reason & Rationality in 2023. Hear Student Reflections: Hear Instructor Reflections: What Our Students Have To Say "We learned how we would like to be as people, how we would like to converse with each other and think about the world." - Anne, Princeton 2025 Watch "When I came here, I really noticed that my perspective was broadened because I was first of all surrounded by a bunch of amazing students." - Harry, Princeton 2025 Watch "I can count four distinct moments in the last three days where I had a physical reaction to a philosophical concept that was explained to me" - Harrison, Princeton 2025 Watch Hear What Parents Are Saying About Reason & Rationality's Princeton 2025 Program Watch Reason & Rationality Students in Action James' research on the Trolley Problem James B Estes attended the original Reason & Rationality discussion series in 2023 as a participant and TA, later joining the team to co-found the Reason & Rationality Summer Program. Inspired by the class session on the Trolley Problem, James conducted empirical research into survey respondents’ intuitions about an important Trolley Problem variant. He then authored and published a peer reviewed article entitled Empirical Evidence Reveals the Motivation of Subjects Who Switch Tracks in the Trolley Loop Case. Congratulations to James on being admitted into Harvard class of 2029. Claire's Reason & Rationality Podcast Ep. 1 Claire Ziebart, a senior at the Cate School in Carpinteria, California, attended Reason & Rationality 2025 at Princeton and Swarthmore as our Student Services intern. Here she hosts a podcast with fellow RNR students, joined by instructor Joe Schmid. They discuss philosopher Robert Nozick's "experience machine" thought experiment.

Upcoming and past events. Intersession Seminar (Private Event) Nueva School, CA January 6, 2026 Free Will: The Debate The Collegiate School, NY November 13, 2025 Eventbrite RSVP Link Seminar and Ethics Bowl Competition The Pingry School, NJ November 15, 2025 Email info@reasonandrationality.com for more information Seminar for Ethics Class (Private Event) Rutgers Prep, NJ November 17, 2025

What We Owe Future Generations By Grace Glukhov In this paper, I will argue we must consider the interests of future generations in any major decision that may significantly impact their lives, as we owe future generations the assurance that we will neither shape their future for the worse nor predetermine them to lives they feel are not worth living. I will demonstrate this through showing we have some moral obligation to future people, in the same way we have moral obligations to those in the present. If one accepts the premise that we should avoid making others feel like their lives are not worth living in the present, it follows that this should extend to our duties to future generations. In the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, Kant says that individuals should not be treated as a means to an end, suggesting that lives have inherent value. I argue that the second formulation extends to the lives of future people. Any lives brought into existence will come to possess the same value as the lives of existing people, meaning we should try to respect future lives in similar ways that we respect present lives. In What We Owe the Future , William MacAskill introduces the idea of longtermism, which says that “positively influencing the long-term future is a key moral priority of our time.” (William MacAskill, "The Case for Longtermism," excerpt from, in What We Owe the Future ) MacAskill claims that future people are a “silent majority” whose lives are shaped by our actions. In support of his argument, he turns to positive trends of the past (e.g. women receiving the right to vote) and examples of what we could prevent (e.g., “engineered viruses [and] A.I.-enabled totalitarianism”). Critics of longtermism might say that this framework places the lives of those who are not yet alive above those who are. They might also say that it is too hard to predict the future. However, I believe we live in an era where we have enough understanding of future threats for us to be able to act in ways we know we can help: for example, climate change. Not only does fighting climate change help those in the present, but it is a topic we understand will detract from future generations’ lives should it be allowed to continue. This is not to say longtermism is the only ideology we should live by. However, it is clear that there is a pattern of social change and improvement when people are motivated by a desire to forge a better world for their children. In the way that previous generations have fought for rights for themselves and for their children—observed through movements like the suffragettes or Civil Rights—by fighting for ourselves and for our descendants, we can create a better world for people in the present and future. In upholding institutions that will continue to harm humanity, we increase the likelihood that future generations will feel that their life is not worth living due to predetermined circumstances. By virtue of challenging institutions that will detract from human life in the present or future, we help not only future generations, but ourselves. Arguments about distance and lack of personal gain should not affect our view of moral action towards future generations. In his 2003 essay We Don’t Owe Them A Thing! A Tough-Minded But Soft-Hearted View of Aid to the Faraway Needy , Jan Narveson argues that while people have a moral responsibility to not harm others, they are not morally obligated to help those they have not harmed. He claims “distance [from future generations] makes a difference only because and therefore if greater distance increases the cost of our doing things at that distance.” He adds “the higher the cost to the agent, other things being equal, the less stringent is that duty. Distance is normally a cost factor.” (Jan Narveson, "We Don't Owe Them a Thing! A Tough-minded but Soft-hearted View of Aid to the Faraway Needy," The Monist 86, no. 3) Under Narveson’s paradigm, we are not morally obligated to help future generations unless we know our actions cause direct harm—something harder to be sure of due to how far away in time they exist from us. In fact, Narveson’s view of distance as a “cost factor” means that helping future generations is burdensome for us. However, I find Narveson’s argument about distance unconvincing for two reasons. Firstly, I believe that non-action is a choice that can still contribute to making things worse for future generations. For example, while someone may not be one of the worlds’ biggest fossil fuel emitters, it is hard to live a normal life without contributing to pollution or harming the environment. If one does not attempt to compensate for some of their emissions, they will most certainly have a role (even if it is a small one) in making the climate crisis worse for future generations. Secondly, though increased distance comes with the potential for more intervening factors and a lessened chain of causation, this does not absolve us of all fault. For example, we (Generation A) may plant the seeds for Generation B to take actions that will impose negative effects on the lives of Generation C. In both this scenario and the scenario of inaction, it is hard to argue that we do not bear any responsibility for suffering. The chain of causation will ultimately lead back to our actions—regardless of our intent. If our actions provide for the potential of future suffering, our distance from that suffering (and any factors in between) does not take away the negative implications of our role. Thus, since we will almost certainly have an impact on future generations, we should feel a moral obligation to mitigate the negative effects our actions would bestow onto future lives. In his paper, Narveson also argues that “very distant people are unlikely ever to be in a strictly reciprocal relation to us,” which means that we do not owe help to future people, as we gain very little (or nothing) from them. (Narveson, "We Don't Owe Them a Thing!") I find this claim to be unconvincing, as we owe things to beings in the present that cannot reciprocate. For example, many would argue we owe newborn babies protection and care. However, our relationships to newborn babies are not reciprocal in the traditional sense. In fact, the love between a parent and a child is often described as unconditional. While we can argue that caring for babies provides us with happiness and fulfillment, there is a strong case to be made that knowing our descendants will be protected and provided the conditions to lead fulfilling lives can also offer fulfillment to us. Thus, just because future generations cannot reciprocate in the traditional sense, that does not lessen our obligations to them. Since each of our actions will have an impact on the future, when faced with multiple choices, we should choose the one that is most moral in that situation. Reasons and Persons by Derek Parfit introduces the non-identity problem, which suggests we cannot be blamed for the suffering of future generations since our actions that caused that suffering have also led to their existence. Parfit argues that an existence with suffering is likely to be better than nonexistence. However, any action leads to a certain future set of people. Though taking the more moral action will lead to a different group of people than picking the less moral action, any action will mean that certain people will exist and certain people will not come into existence. Thus, we should focus on our actions being well intentioned, as to avoid causing suffering to anyone. It is plausible to suggest that trying to center our actions around helping lives that do not yet exist can take away from helping current people. However, as I have argued, we live in a day and age where we have a fairly concrete understanding of both the problems future generations are likely to face and ways in which we can help mitigate these problems. As I discussed, taking action that considers the lives of future generations rarely comes at a personal expense to us. Therefore, we owe it to future generations to make good intentioned decisions about future conditions that will impact them. Bibliography Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals . MacAskill, William. "The Case for Longtermism." In What We Owe the Future . Excerpt from In What We Owe the Future. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/05/opinion/the-case-for-longtermism.html Narveson, Jan. "We Don't Owe Them a Thing! A Tough-minded but Soft-hearted View of Aid to the Faraway Needy." The Monist 86, no. 3. Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons . Clarendon Press, 1987.

Our classrooms are designed to inspire, featuring small, discussion-friendly setups that encourage active participation and collaboration. Reason & Rationality Classroom and Dorms Our classrooms are designed to inspire, featuring small, discussion-friendly setups that encourage active participation and collaboration. Each session takes place in a focused yet welcoming environment, ensuring every student feels heard and engaged. After a day of stimulating learning, students can relax and recharge in our comfortable dorms, which provide a safe and social space to unwind, connect with peers, and reflect on the day’s insights. Together, our classrooms and dorms create a balanced experience that supports both academic growth and personal connections. Apply Now! 2025 Summer Program Glimpse Into Classrooms and Dormitory Accommodations Princeton Theological Seminary Swarthmore College Ready to Take the Next Step? Apply Now!

Reason & Rationality Foundation & Advanced Programs at Princeton Session 1: June 7 - June 19, 2026 Session 2: June 21 - July 2, 2026 Apply Now What is Reason & Rationality? Reason & Rationality equips high school students with the tools to think rigorously about complex questions, separate fact from ideology, and participate in lively intellectual discussion. The 2-week Foundation Program focuses on 20 Big Ideas in Philosophy, Economics and Ethics. Classes are rigorous, fast-paced and full of humor. Students sharpen their critical thinking and communication skills and leave with a grasp of the intellectual frameworks that empower them to become confident independent thinkers. Peter Bach-y-Rita DEAN OF ACADEMICS Peter Bach-y-Rita: Ph.D., MIT (Philosophy), J.D. Stanford Law School, A.B. Princeton University (highest honors). Dr. Bach-y-Rita's dissertation at MIT was at the intersection of ethics, biology and technology. He has published work on intellectual property, bankruptcy law, and the nature of legal causation. He co-founded Reason & Rationality in 2023. Hear Student Reflections: Hear Instructor Reflections: See What Our Students Have To Say "We learned how we would like to be as people, how we would like to converse with each other and think about the world." - Anne, Princeton 2025 Watch "When I came here, I really noticed that my perspective was broadened because I was first of all surrounded by a bunch of amazing students." - Harry, Princeton 2025 Watch "I can count four distinct moments in the last three days where I had a physical reaction to a philosophical concept that was explained to me" - Harrison, Princeton 2025 Watch See What Parents Are Saying About Reason & Rationality's Princeton 2025 Program Watch James' research on the famous Trolley Problem Immediate Impact James B Estes attended the original Reason & Rationality discussion series in 2023 as a participant and TA, later joining the team to co-found the Reason & Rationality Summer Program. Inspired by the class session on the Trolley Problem, James conducted empirical research into survey respondents’ intuitions about an important Trolley Problem variant. He then authored and published a peer reviewed article entitled Empirical Evidence Reveals the Motivation of Subjects Who Switch Tracks in the Trolley Loop Case. Apply Now!

Human and Animal Value By Harry Moss This essay intends to answer the following question: if given the choice, should one opt to save the life of one human child or the life of 10^10–ten billion–mice? However, I will interpret this question as follows: should we act as if a human life has value that infinitely exceeds the value of another animal’s life? I believe that this is what the moral dilemma truly seeks to address. For utilitarians–put very simply, those who believe that morality demands we maximize the good consequences of our actions and minimize the bad consequences–the answer to this question tends to be easy. Assuming that there are no extenuating circumstances, we should save the mice. This is because the goal of utilitarians is to maximize total utility. For some, this is the sum total of pleasure in the universe minus the sum total of pain. For many others, utility is something more complex. Using pleasure and pain makes it easy to explain why we should save the mice, though. Ten billion mice almost certainly allow for more pleasure to exist in the universe than a single human child does. Many more complex notions of utility would lead us to the same conclusion. Because the utilitarian answer is easy, and because I am not especially sympathetic to utilitarianism, I will attempt to give a Kantian answer to this question. Kantian ethics focuses on the duties a person has towards themselves and others rather than the quantifiable consequences of actions. Like utilitarianism, it is a monist system–it maintains that there is essentially only one guiding principle. Kant calls this the categorical imperative, but he formulates it in three different ways. For the purposes of this argument, I will use two of these formulae. The first is the Formula of Universal Law. To understand this, one must understand the concept of a maxim, which is a combination of action and purpose. For example: “I will eat this slice of toast in order to satisfy my hunger.” In very simplified terms, for a maxim to be morally permissible, it must be such that one could live in a world where everyone acted according to the maxim. In the case of toast-eating to satisfy hunger, there is no problem. But consider: “I will steal my neighbor’s money in order to increase my wealth.” If everyone acts according to this maxim, no one’s wealth will increase because everyone will suffer constant theft. Such a maxim cannot be universalized, and so is immoral. One can think of the Formula of Universal Law as analogous to “do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” though it is not precisely the same. The second is the Formula of Humanity. This requires us to conceive of other people as ends-in-themselves. The other side of this, which is easy to intuitively understand and is sufficient for my argument, is that we must never treat others as mere means to an end. We cannot use others for our own gain while simultaneously giving no regard to their interests. Because both of these formulae have a certain level of intuitive appeal, I will not explain in any significant detail why Kantians accept them. Going forward, I will make the ironic assumption that the Formula of Humanity applies to non-human animals as well, but the Formula of Universal Law does not (1). I will assume that duty does require us not to treat animals as mere means. However, I will also assume that, when we imagine everyone acting according to our maxims to test their morality, we need not and should not include non-rational animals. Circling back to our dilemma, it is clear that we cannot act in a way which is entirely commensurate with our duty. In order to act in accordance with a conception of humans and animals as ends-in-themselves, we ought to try to save their lives. However, since we cannot save all the lives involved, we are not required by duty to do so. This is in line with a common philosophical idea that if one ought to do something, one must be capable of doing that thing. Using only the Formula of Humanity, the answer may seem clear. Since both the human child and the mice are ends-in-themselves, it may seem we should save the mice. There are more of them, after all, and we understand simple math. All things being equal, this seems a fair conclusion to draw. It is the conclusion I would like to draw, because I myself am committed to the idea that animal lives are of great moral worth. However, all things may not be equal. Consider that Kantian ethics does not define moral conduct by its consequences. This does not in the least mean that we should not choose what we believe to be the better of two outcomes when the option is prevented. However, duty may prevent us from doing so. In that case, we are obligated to choose the “worse” outcome, which is not actually worse in a moral sense because it is the moral choice. In fact, something that is not duty may even prevent us from choosing the better outcome. Consider special obligations. Parents prioritize the interests of their children over the interests of other children, and this is perfectly consistent with the Formula of Universal Law so long as they permit other parents to do the same. However, acting in accordance with this kind of special obligation is not the kind of duty the Formula of Humanity gives us. Parents could decide to weigh the interests of all children equally, and this is also consistent with the Formula of Universal Law. I believe that the Formula of Universal Law often creates this kind of situation, in which several conflicting maxims are morally permissible so long as one adopts them on a consistent basis. A perfect duty like our obligation to never treat others as mere means can break the tie, but we do not always have this sort of duty to fall back on. Now, consider the following maxim: “I shall save human lives rather than animal lives in order to protect the interests of my species.” Adopting this maxim does not permit us to kill animals to save human lives, because that would violate the Formula of Humanity. If, however, one accepts the distinction between killing and letting die, then it may permit us to save the human child rather than ten billion mice. Here is a brief argument for why we should accept this distinction: Let us assume, as I have assumed earlier, that ought implies can. Let us assume also, as a Kantian would be inclined to maintain, that we ought not kill people. Consider, now, a simple fact. All over the world, many people die on a daily basis. Each one of us could devote our time to saving the lives of as many of these people as possible. However, we cannot save all of them. Even removing death by old age, it cannot be the case that each of us ought to never let a person die because it is not possible that each of us never lets a person die. However, I maintain that it is possible and desirable that each of us never ought to kill. Some cases may be exceptions, such as those in which we must kill a prospective murderer to prevent him from completing his act. Such exceptions, however, would not explain why we are permitted to let people die if letting die is, in fact, identical to killing. This is one reason why I believe that we should accept the distinction between killing and letting die. It may otherwise be impossible for us to have a duty which prohibits us from killing. Notice that this argument, if it succeeds, also establishes that we cannot have a duty which simply prevents us from letting people die under any circumstances. I think it is likely that such an argument has been made previously, and so there may be objections to it of which I am not yet aware. If, however, it succeeds, then I believe the maxim: “I shall save human lives rather than animal lives in order to protect the interests of my species” allows us to save the human child rather than ten billion mice. As in the case of special obligation, a contradictory maxim can also be universalized: “Whenever the lives of conscious creatures are at stake, I shall save as many as possible in order to respect these creatures as ends-in-themselves to the greatest possible extent.” Thus, I believe that the Kantian may be permitted to make either choice in the dilemma. This, for me, is an undesirable outcome. Given the brevity of this essay, I very much hope that I have overlooked something which commits the Kantian to saving the mice. (1) It is important to note that Kantians broadly derive morality from practical reason. Practical reason is a faculty possessed only by rational creatures, so it seems difficult to explain why any formula of the moral law should protect non-human animals. Indeed, Kant himself maintained that we have no duties towards animals. Thosewanting for a good answer to this question should seek out Christine Korsgaard’s Fellow Creatures, which makesarguments that initially led me to the conclusion which I assume here.

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