Human and Animal Value

 

By Harry Moss

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This essay intends to answer the following question: if given the choice, should one opt to save the life of one human child or the life of 10^10–ten billion–mice? However, I will interpret this question as follows: should we act as if a human life has value that infinitely exceeds the value of another animal’s life? I believe that this is what the moral dilemma truly seeks to address.

 

For utilitarians–put very simply, those who believe that morality demands we maximize the good consequences of our actions and minimize the bad consequences–the answer to this question tends to be easy. Assuming that there are no extenuating circumstances, we should save the mice. This is because the goal of utilitarians is to maximize total utility. For some, this is the sum total of pleasure in the universe minus the sum total of pain. For many others, utility is something more complex. Using pleasure and pain makes it easy to explain why we should save the mice, though. Ten billion mice almost certainly allow for more pleasure to exist in the universe than a single human child does. Many more complex notions of utility would lead us to the same conclusion.

 

Because the utilitarian answer is easy, and because I am not especially sympathetic to utilitarianism, I will attempt to give a Kantian answer to this question. Kantian ethics focuses on the duties a person has towards themselves and others rather than the quantifiable consequences of actions. Like utilitarianism, it is a monist system–it maintains that there is essentially only one guiding principle. Kant calls this the categorical imperative, but he formulates it in three different ways. For the purposes of this argument, I will use two of these formulae.

 

The first is the Formula of Universal Law. To understand this, one must understand the concept of a maxim, which is a combination of action and purpose. For example: “I will eat this slice of toast in order to satisfy my hunger.” In very simplified terms, for a maxim to be morally permissible, it must be such that one could live in a world where everyone acted according to the maxim. In the case of toast-eating to satisfy hunger, there is no problem. But consider: “I will steal my neighbor’s money in order to increase my wealth.” If everyone acts according to this maxim, no one’s wealth will increase because everyone will suffer constant theft. Such a maxim cannot be universalized, and so is immoral. One can think of the Formula of Universal Law as analogous to “do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” though it is not precisely the same.

 

The second is the Formula of Humanity. This requires us to conceive of other people as ends-in-themselves. The other side of this, which is easy to intuitively understand and is sufficient for my argument, is that we must never treat others as mere means to an end. We cannot use others for our own gain while simultaneously giving no regard to their interests.

Because both of these formulae have a certain level of intuitive appeal, I will not explain in any significant detail why Kantians accept them. Going forward, I will make the ironic assumption that the Formula of Humanity applies to non-human animals as well, but the Formula of Universal Law does not (1). I will assume that duty does require us not to treat animals as mere means. However, I will also assume that, when we imagine everyone acting according to our maxims to test their morality, we need not and should not include non-rational animals.

 

Circling back to our dilemma, it is clear that we cannot act in a way which is entirely commensurate with our duty. In order to act in accordance with a conception of humans and animals as ends-in-themselves, we ought to try to save their lives. However, since we cannot save all the lives involved, we are not required by duty to do so. This is in line with a common philosophical idea that if one ought to do something, one must be capable of doing that thing.

 

Using only the Formula of Humanity, the answer may seem clear. Since both the human child and the mice are ends-in-themselves, it may seem we should save the mice. There are more of them, after all, and we understand simple math. All things being equal, this seems a fair conclusion to draw. It is the conclusion I would like to draw, because I myself am committed to
the idea that animal lives are of great moral worth. However, all things may not be equal. Consider that Kantian ethics does not define moral conduct by its consequences. This does not in the least mean that we should not choose what we believe to be the better of two outcomes when the option is prevented. However, duty may prevent us from doing so. In that case, we are
obligated to choose the “worse” outcome, which is not actually worse in a moral sense because it is the moral choice. In fact, something that is not duty may even prevent us from choosing the better outcome. Consider special obligations. Parents prioritize the interests of their children over the interests of other children, and this is perfectly consistent with the Formula of Universal Law so long as they permit other parents to do the same. However, acting in accordance with this kind of special obligation is not the kind of duty the Formula of Humanity gives us. Parents could decide to weigh the interests of all children equally, and this is also consistent with the Formula of Universal Law. I believe that the Formula of Universal Law often creates this kind of situation, in which several conflicting maxims are morally permissible so long as one adopts them on a consistent basis. A perfect duty like our obligation to never treat others as mere means can break the tie, but we do not always have this sort of duty to fall back on.

 

Now, consider the following maxim: “I shall save human lives rather than animal lives in order to protect the interests of my species.” Adopting this maxim does not permit us to kill animals to save human lives, because that would violate the Formula of Humanity. If, however, one accepts the distinction between killing and letting die, then it may permit us to save the human child rather than ten billion mice. Here is a brief argument for why we should accept this distinction:

 

Let us assume, as I have assumed earlier, that ought implies can. Let us assume also, as a Kantian would be inclined to maintain, that we ought not kill people. Consider, now, a simple fact. All over the world, many people die on a daily basis. Each one of us could devote our time to saving the lives of as many of these people as possible. However, we cannot save all of them. Even removing death by old age, it cannot be the case that each of us ought to never let a person die because it is not possible that each of us never lets a person die. However, I maintain that it is possible and desirable that each of us never ought to kill. Some cases may be exceptions, such as those in which we must kill a prospective murderer to prevent him from completing his act. Such
exceptions, however, would not explain why we are permitted to let people die if letting die is, in fact, identical to killing. This is one reason why I believe that we should accept the distinction between killing and letting die. It may otherwise be impossible for us to have a duty which prohibits us from killing. Notice that this argument, if it succeeds, also establishes that we cannot have a duty which simply prevents us from letting people die under any circumstances.

 

I think it is likely that such an argument has been made previously, and so there may be objections to it of which I am not yet aware. If, however, it succeeds, then I believe the maxim: “I shall save human lives rather than animal lives in order to protect the interests of my species” allows us to save the human child rather than ten billion mice. As in the case of special obligation, a contradictory maxim can also be universalized: “Whenever the lives of conscious creatures are at stake, I shall save as many as possible in order to respect these creatures as ends-in-themselves to the greatest possible extent.” Thus, I believe that the Kantian may be permitted to make either choice in the dilemma. This, for me, is an undesirable outcome. Given the brevity of this essay, I very much hope that I have overlooked something which commits the Kantian to saving the mice.

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(1) It is important to note that Kantians broadly derive morality from practical reason. Practical reason is a faculty possessed only by rational creatures, so it seems difficult to explain why any formula of the moral law should protect non-human animals. Indeed, Kant himself maintained that we have no duties towards animals. Thosewanting for a good answer to this question should seek out Christine Korsgaard’s Fellow Creatures, which makesarguments that initially led me to the conclusion which I assume here.

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