What We Owe Future Generations

 

By Grace Glukhov

In this paper, I will argue we must consider the interests of future generations in any major decision that may significantly impact their lives, as we owe future generations the assurance that we will neither shape their future for the worse nor predetermine them to lives they feel are not worth living. I will demonstrate this through showing we have some moral obligation to future people, in the same way we have moral obligations to those in the present.

If one accepts the premise that we should avoid making others feel like their lives are not worth living in the present, it follows that this should extend to our duties to future generations. In the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, Kant says that individuals should not be treated as a means to an end, suggesting that lives have inherent value. I argue that the second formulation extends to the lives of future people. Any lives brought into existence will come to possess the same value as the lives of existing people, meaning we should try to respect future lives in similar ways that we respect present lives. In What We Owe the Future, William MacAskill introduces the idea of longtermism, which says that “positively influencing the long-term future is a key moral priority of our time.” (William MacAskill, "The Case for Longtermism," excerpt from, in What We Owe the Future) MacAskill claims that future people are a “silent majority” whose lives are shaped by our actions. In support of his argument, he turns to positive trends of the past (e.g. women receiving the right to vote) and examples of what we could prevent (e.g., “engineered viruses [and] A.I.-enabled totalitarianism”). Critics of longtermism might say that this framework places the lives of those who are not yet alive above those who are. They might also say that it is too hard to predict the future. However, I believe we live in an era where we have enough understanding of future threats for us to be able to act in ways we know we can help: for example, climate change. Not only does fighting climate change help those in the present, but it is a topic we understand will detract from future generations’ lives should it be allowed to continue. This is not to say longtermism is the only ideology we should live by. However, it is clear that there is a pattern of social change and improvement when people are motivated by a desire to forge a better world for their children. In the way that previous generations have fought for rights for themselves and for their children—observed through movements like the suffragettes or Civil Rights—by fighting for ourselves and for our descendants, we can create a better world for people in the present and future. In upholding institutions that will continue to harm humanity, we increase the likelihood that future generations will feel that their life is not worth living due to predetermined circumstances. By virtue of challenging institutions that will detract from human life in the present or future, we help not only future generations, but ourselves.
 

Arguments about distance and lack of personal gain should not affect our view of moral action towards future generations. In his 2003 essay We Don’t Owe Them A Thing! A Tough-Minded But Soft-Hearted View of Aid to the Faraway Needy, Jan Narveson argues that while people have a moral responsibility to not harm others, they are not morally obligated to help those they have not harmed. He claims “distance [from future generations] makes a difference only because and therefore if greater distance increases the cost of our doing things at that distance.” He adds “the higher the cost to the agent, other things being equal, the less stringent is that duty. Distance is normally a cost factor.” (Jan Narveson, "We Don't Owe Them a Thing! A Tough-minded but Soft-hearted View of Aid to the Faraway Needy," The Monist 86, no. 3) Under Narveson’s paradigm, we are not morally obligated to help future generations unless we know our actions cause direct harm—something harder to be sure of due to how far away in time they exist from us. In fact, Narveson’s view of distance as a “cost factor” means that helping future generations is burdensome for us. However, I find Narveson’s argument about distance unconvincing for two reasons. Firstly, I believe that non-action is a choice that can still contribute to making things worse for future generations. For example, while someone may not be one of the worlds’ biggest fossil fuel emitters, it is hard to live a normal life without contributing to pollution or harming the environment. If one does not attempt to compensate for some of their emissions, they will most certainly have a role (even if it is a small one) in making the climate crisis worse for future generations. Secondly, though increased distance comes with the potential for more intervening factors and a lessened chain of causation, this does not absolve us of all fault. For example, we (Generation A) may plant the seeds for Generation B to take actions that will impose negative effects on the lives of Generation C. In both this scenario and the scenario of inaction, it is hard to argue that we do not bear any responsibility for suffering. The chain of causation will ultimately lead back to our actions—regardless of our intent. If our actions provide for the potential of future suffering, our distance from that suffering (and any factors in between) does not take away the negative implications of our role. Thus, since we will almost certainly have an impact on future generations, we should feel a moral obligation to mitigate the negative effects our actions would bestow onto future lives. 
 

In his paper, Narveson also argues that “very distant people are unlikely ever to be in a strictly reciprocal relation to us,” which means that we do not owe help to future people, as we gain very little (or nothing) from them. (Narveson, "We Don't Owe Them a Thing!") I find this claim to be unconvincing, as we owe things to beings in the present that cannot reciprocate. For example, many would argue we owe newborn babies protection and care. However, our relationships to newborn babies are not reciprocal in the traditional sense. In fact, the love between a parent and a child is often described as unconditional. While we can argue that caring for babies provides us with happiness and fulfillment, there is a strong case to be made that knowing our descendants will be protected and provided the conditions to lead fulfilling lives can also offer fulfillment to us. Thus, just because future generations cannot reciprocate in the traditional sense, that does not lessen our obligations to them.
 

Since each of our actions will have an impact on the future, when faced with multiple choices, we should choose the one that is most moral in that situation. Reasons and Persons by Derek Parfit introduces the non-identity problem, which suggests we cannot be blamed for the suffering of future generations since our actions that caused that suffering have also led to their existence. Parfit argues that an existence with suffering is likely to be better than nonexistence. However, any action leads to a certain future set of people. Though taking the more moral action will lead to a different group of people than picking the less moral action, any action will mean that certain people will exist and certain people will not come into existence. Thus, we should focus on our actions being well intentioned, as to avoid causing suffering to anyone.
 

It is plausible to suggest that trying to center our actions around helping lives that do not yet exist can take away from helping current people. However, as I have argued, we live in a day and age where we have a fairly concrete understanding of both the problems future generations are likely to face and ways in which we can help mitigate these problems. As I discussed, taking action that considers the lives of future generations rarely comes at a personal expense to us. Therefore, we owe it to future generations to make good intentioned decisions about future conditions that will impact them. 

Bibliography

 

Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.

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MacAskill, William. "The Case for Longtermism." In What We Owe the Future. Excerpt from In What We Owe the Future. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/05/opinion/the-case-for-longtermism.html

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Narveson, Jan. "We Don't Owe Them a Thing! A Tough-minded but Soft-hearted View of Aid to the Faraway Needy." The Monist 86, no. 3.

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Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. Clarendon Press, 1987.

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